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RESUMEN: Este documento utiliza un enfoque descriptivo-analítico utilizando la teoría de la 
disuasión para predecir las causas de la participación saudita en los asuntos étnico-religiosos en la 
región de Baluchistán, Irán; entonces, la pregunta es: "¿Qué papel juega Arabia Saudita en las 
tensiones étnico-religiosas en la región de Baluchistán?" En respuesta, pone a prueba la hipótesis de 
que "Arabia Saudita está utilizando razones políticas e ideológicas para usar su poder en la región 
fronteriza para crear tensión, debido a su afiliación religiosa con los residentes iraníes de 
Baluchistán". Los resultados de la investigación muestran que para poner fin a la interferencia del 
país en los asuntos internos iraníes, los gobiernos de Irán y Arabia Saudita deben mejorar las 
relaciones regionales y nacionales con los vecinos y grupos afiliados a los dos países de la región. 
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ABSTRACT: This paper uses a descriptive-analytical approach using deterrence theory to predict 
the causes of Saudi involvement in ethnic-religious affairs in Iran's Baluchistan region; so, the 
question is, "What role does Saudi Arabia play in ethnic-religious tensions in the Balochistan 
region?" In response, it tests the hypothesis that "Saudi Arabia is using political and ideological 
reasons to use its power in the border region to create tension, because of its religious affiliation 
with Iranian Balochistan residents". As the results of the research show, to end the country's 
interference in Iranian internal affairs, the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia must improve 
regional and denational relations with neighbors and groups affiliated with the two countries in the 
region. 
KEY WORDS: Saudi Arabia, religious tensions, Balochistan region. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are considered major powers in the Middle East, each seeking to increase its 
influence in this region and in the Islamic world. This has led to an ever-increasing competition 
between the two countries, both before and after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, although after the 
revolution, the competition increased in the sphere of influence and influence among Islamic 
countries.  
In general, the rivalry between the two countries has had a dramatic effect on relations between the 
two countries and has led to many ups and downs. In the course of these relations, the two countries 
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sometimes stand against each other on regional, cultural and religious issues, and sometimes they 
have worked together on mutual interests (Ghorbani and Sangdaninee, 2014:2-3). 
The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has undergone some changes since September 11, 
2001. The geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and its impact on the relations between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia can be described in four periods: before the Islamic Revolution, after the Islamic Revolution 
until the end of the Iran-Iraq War, from the end of the war to September 11, and from September 
11. These four periods influenced by global, regional and internal factors, have led to different types 
of relationships. Sometimes, the peaceful behavior of the rivals has been variable in gaining 
regional leadership before the Islamic Revolution to hostile behavior in 1981. Subsequently, this 
kind of growing peaceful relationship has dominated regional cooperation and regional integration, 
especially after 9/11, and new developments in the region, including the fall of the Taliban and 
Saddam Hussein (Hafez Nia and Mohammad, 2005:1). 
This research examines the causes and ways of Saudi involvement in ethnic and religious affairs in 
the Balochistan region of Iran and the creation of ethnic and religious tensions in this border region. 
Therefore, it poses the question: "What role does Saudi Arabia play in ethnic-religious tensions in 
the Balochistan region?" And tests the hypothesis that "the country of Saudi Arabia has a religious 
affiliation with Balochistan residents, due to reasons Political and ideological use of their power in 
the border area to create tension". 
The significance of the present research is that the Iranian society has several ethnicities including 
Azeri, Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkmen and Arabs, as well as several linguistic and Islamic groups and 
have a high religious bond with Saudi Arabia. The distribution of these groups across the 
geographic map of Iran is such that uniformly the whole Iranian soil is mosaically different from 
these ethnic groups.  
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The existence of ethnic-religious norms and different languages makes these tribes and groups 
separate, often dependent on the transboundary sequences in different geographical regions of Iran. 
Therefore, the existence of these elements of the segregation of the demographic section leads us to 
categorically consider ethnic-religious gaps as one of the most important divisions of the social 
structure of Iran. 
The theoretical framework of the present research is the theory of deterrence, which is based on the 
method of realism. Inhibition, increasing the possibility of stopping an opponent's offensive attack 
by persuading him to be unwittingly attacked or overcoming the threat posed by the attack. 
Inhibition as one of the fundamental concepts in the realistic analysis of power, another aspect of 
the traditional concept of balance of power and the form of influence in international relations and 
society without transcendental authority, is the driving force behind the readiness and orientation of 
national policies in an autonomy based on the obvious existence of the enemy and the polar 
relationship of balance of power and maintaining the status quo (in terms of stability on the frontiers 
and immunity of territorial integrity) is considered vital, which, regardless of military practice, will 
support diplomacy and foreign policy.  
The deterrence policy is potentially affecting environmental threats. The type of threats and the 
severity of them are effective in shaping this policy and its nature. Therefore, considering the 
evolution of the quantity and quality of threats, the definitions of defense deterrence have also been 
transformed. Indeed, the attainment of the ultimate goal of deterrence is to prevent the objectivity of 
finding and surviving an external threat without bearing the hefty military-security costs of different 
hosts and resources, which can be distinguished from hard and soft deterrence (Saed, 2010:11). 
The permanent inflammation of the Middle East security environment has forced regional 
governments to expand their extensive military capabilities and provide conventional and 
unconventional weapons in a widespread form called "Hard deterrence." It also forces states to use 
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more and more precisely their political, cultural and economic capabilities to confront their 
opponents, which they call "soft deterrence". Meanwhile, due to the remarkable superiority of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in challenging areas in the Middle East, its main rivals, including Saudi 
Arabia, have made Saudi use of its soft deterrent capabilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
One of these existing rituals is interference in ethnic-religious affairs in different parts of Iran.  
The method of data analysis of this research is divided into two groups: 1. Historical method, which 
is based on historical sources and texts for analyzing and writing the historical sections of the paper; 
2. Empirical method, based on which the explicit data and the measurement of research are 
investigated and they are cited.  
The present research is divided into five sections: The first part of the general research that reviews 
the subject. The second part examines a number of stressors between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The 
third section examines the position of Saudi Arabia in promoting ethnic concerns in Sistan and 
Baluchestan province. In Section 4, the causes of the country's interference in the religious affairs of 
the country are investigated and the conclusion in the fifth section is discussed. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Stress factors between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Here are four examples of major differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia: 
Cultural ideological conflicts. 
Since Saudi Arabia and Iran define their national identity on the basis of religious concepts, 
religious differences can be considered as an important element in the relations between the two 
countries. When the Wahhabi groups came to power in Saudi Arabia, they laid the groundwork for 
a new geopolitical and ideological contradiction with Iran. Such contradictions can be considered 
during the reign of Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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The main focus of Wahab's ideology is the fight against Shi'ism in Iran and other countries in the 
region. Saudi Arabia carries out such an action on the basis of Arabic indifference, regional 
tribalism and its distinctive identity with Iran. Saudi Arabia also uses such indicators in its security 
relations with other Middle Eastern countries. Based on the religious and ideological approach of 
the Saudi authorities, issues such as democracy, freedom, and human rights have nothing to do with 
Arab identity. Therefore, Saudi Arabia analyzes any political change in the Middle East based on 
Arab identity and Salafi Sunni religion, which has led Iran and Saudi Arabia to compete in the 
Middle East (Motaghi, 2010:55). 
From the ideological point of view and the discourse of power and political legitimacy, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are in opposition. The Iranian government has laid out the teachings of two of the 
most prominent Shiite clerics of Imam Khomeini who proposed the Waliyat Fiqiyah and Shahid 
Mohammad Bagher Sadr, who introduced the Islamic Republic's theory, but the Saudi government 
is back to unity with Mohammed bin Saud and Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab. Given the 
differences in the teachings of Wahhabism and Shi'ism, Iran and Saudi Arabia are unwilling to face 
each other. 
Event of September 11, 2001. 
Events, such as the occupation of the American Embassy in 1978, the Iran-Iraq War, the overthrow 
of the Iranian passenger plane by the United States in 1366, and Iran's nuclear program were among 
the most influential events in Iran's foreign relations since the 1979 revolution.  
Although Iran's relations with the United States and Israel were the most challenging part of Iran's 
foreign relations, Iran's relations with the Islamic countries, the Middle East and its neighbors have 
been ups and downs. Temporary interruption of relations with Saudi Arabia after the 1981 Hajj, a 
dispute with the United Arab Emirates in the possession of the three large Tang Islands, Tang-e-
Mink and Abu Musa, the blurring of relations with Bahrain following Bahrain's charge of Iranian 
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support for dissatisfied Shiites, following the support of Iran for Khaled Estambullah's actions, the 
blurring of relations with Kuwait due to the Iran-Iraq War, and the blurring of relations with Jordan 
are examples of the tensions after the Islamic Revolution (Movassaghi, 2016: 44-45). 
With September 11, 2001, following the collapse of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the regional 
power of Iran increased, and the regional power cycle in the Middle East was beneficial to Iran, as 
Saudi Arabia's allied governments were declining in the region, and on Iran's allies, especially in 
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen added. This action triggered a reaction by the Saudi government 
and other allies. To the point where the King of Jordan condemned Iran as a Shiite crescent and 
accused the Islamic Republic of seeking to establish an Iranian empire (Cerioli, 2018:8-18). 
Arab Spring. 
In 2009, when the Middle East region was involved in the Arab Spring, a number of Saudi Arabian 
states collapsed, or they were in conflict and internal disputes. In this regard, Iran is also sponsoring 
self-financing groups and allies. In countries such as Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, the rivalry of 
the two countries has intensified to infiltrate, causing many political changes in these countries and 
the way in which interethnic groups interact (Haveshki, 2015:2-4). In explaining the current state of 
the regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is possible to examine the situation in 
several centers of the crisis in the region: 
(A) Disagreement over Palestine: Iran wants to maintain resistance to complete Palestinian 
liberation and Saudi Arabia seeks to establish peace between Arabs and Israel. (B) Disagreements 
over Hezbollah Lebanon: Iran sees Hezbollah as an effective force against Israel's excesses and 
always emphasizes its strengthening, while Saudi Arabia regards Hezbollah as an essential element 
in the spread of unrest in the region and the Arab-Israeli peace process. (C) Competition in New 
Iraq: Iran is attempting to activate the way for the establishment of Shi'ite rule in Iraq, with the 
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expansion of its influence in Iraq, while Saudi Arabia does not accept Shiite rule in Iraq. (D) 
Competition in the Syrian crisis: Iran has sought to maintain Assad since the beginning of the 
Syrian crisis, and in this way, all efforts have been made to eliminate all the insecurity and 
survivors of the Assad dynasty. In this process, he even has military and logistical assistance to 
Syria, while Saudi Arabia wants to eliminate Assad and supports the Takfiri and Sunni opposition 
groups against Assad (Ghantous, Georgy, 2019 3-6). E) The difference in viewpoint on the goals 
and results of Iran's nuclear policy: Saudi Arabia has always tried to introduce Iran's nuclear 
program as a military program, and it is considered as the driving force behind the nuclear rivalry in 
the Middle East.  
This attempt by Saudi Arabia has intensified due to the progress of Iran's nuclear program and its 
strategic implications for balancing regional power with the recent developments in the periphery, 
"like the fall of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq as a balancing force in Iran, the strengthening of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the strengthening of Hamas's relations with Iran" (Shojaee, 2011:32). 
Associated Groups of Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
The two countries sought to create their own militia groups in the Middle East to counteract the 
threats posed by each other and maintain their national interests in the region. Among the pro-
Iranian groups include the Habibullah groups in Lebanon, Hasht al-Sha'abi in Iraq, Ansarullah in 
Yemen, the Fatimid and Zimbabwean in Syria, including groups from Saudi Arabia, including al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq, The Islamic State of the Dinner, Al-Qaeda Dinner, 
Ahrar Al-Sham and so on.  
In some Middle Eastern countries, there have been advocates of the two countries that have created 
tensions between the two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and each of these countries refers to 
affiliated groups as terrorists and within the framework of the "Fight against Terrorist" They fight 
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with them. In this regard, both countries supported the opposition within the borders of each other 
in a variety of ways; for example, Iran's response to the assassination of Sheikh Nimrannar by the 
government of Saudi Arabia, which caused the conflict at Tehran's embassy, resulted in the 
interruption of political relations between the two countries. And Saudi-sponsored military-financial 
support from ethnic religious groups opposed to the Islamic regime in the border areas of Iran can 
be cited. (Hilterman, 2007). 
Saudi role in ethnic tensions in Sistan and Baluchistan province. 
Saudi Arabia, is one of the centers of high schools of religion in the world and the region, provides 
free religious education services to Sunni religious scholars in Iran. The effect of these organized 
propaganda has been at least two aspects of Iran's national security as a threat; reducing and 
reducing national identities and nationalities in favor of religious identities. The first threat is the 
expansion of Wahhabi thinking, especially in the eastern and southeastern Iran. Promotion of this 
thinking, especially the efforts to develop various religious organizations, in addition to 
strengthening the divergence energy of these areas towards the central core of the government, has 
increased the convergence of Sunni Sunni and Hanafi Baluchi eastern and southeast Iran (Golrangi, 
2015:62-97). 
The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, the Middle East, the Arab world and 
Islam, and even in the international arena, is indicative of their limited ability to expand bilateral 
cooperation, but the root of the main conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia should be sought in 
religious matters Expansion of Pakistani extremist ties with Saudi Arabia and the continuation and 
strengthening of the support of the Afghan Taliban and the support of paramilitary battles through 
extremist Islamists in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and the countries of Central Asia and ... have 
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had unpleasant effects on the interests of Iran and other countries. Saudi Arabia has the largest share 
in equipping, organizing and strengthening Pakistani radical groups.  
Unofficial statistics indicate that there are about 20,000 religious schools in Pakistan. It is worth 
mentioning that more than 1,549,244 students study at these schools, with Saudi Arabia having the 
largest share in equipping these schools. Establishment of religious seminaries and the recruitment 
of religious scholars, the construction of universities, libraries and mosques, shops in the form of 
Wahhabi propaganda, the entry of some people in some service and relief businesses in some 
charities, etc., with the propaganda and Wahabism is being promoted from Saudi Arabia 
(Mohammadi and Ahmadi, 2016:12). 
The arrival of Salafi clerics in Sistan and Baluchestan province, which are often close to the 
religious culture of Saudi Arabia, mainly from Indian and Pakistani schools of thought for the 
promotion of fundamentalist thoughts, as well as the spread of Wahhabi's ideas, which, with biased 
and political views, have contradict Shiite religion It also recognizes the role of local authorities as 
indisputable in religious and ethnic discriminatory practices, making Balochistan become one of the 
central areas of Iran (Keshavarz, 2014). 
Before the creation of al-Qaeda, the Sunnis of Iran had no definite pattern and policy, but after the 
activities of al-Qaeda and bin Laden, a small part of the Sunnis, adopted the organization's model. 
Particularly among young people, they have been influenced by many social activities, their 
expectations and expectations, and the expectation of participation in social, political and cultural 
sectors, with the same approach. The outcome of these moves is to exacerbate religious differences 
and negative stances. A look at ethnic movements in recent years has shown that the ethnic 
challenge in different parts of the country, in terms of the emergence of the emergence, has, in 
particular, the ethnic heritage of religious backgrounds in the East. In the meantime, extremist 
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groups in Pakistan, influenced by Saudi Arabia, have their cultural effects, and this phenomenon is 
remarkable for those part of the Sunni people who have extreme tendencies.  
Considering the Taliban and al-Qaeda's thoughts and the emphasis on creating a global government 
and fighting central states that have not been affecting the Sunni people, and especially the youth, it 
is probable that groups that want to take actions or provocations against the Islamic Republic of Iran 
are likely to be formed. The Jundallah group led by Abdul Malik Rigi confirms this issue 
(Keshavarz, 2014). 
Wahhabism in the Balochistan region of Iran has also been well-placed for promotion and 
development. The existence of the Sunni Hanafi who are decisive for Shi'a, the freedom of the 
Wahhabis in Pakistan as well as the ethnic affinity of the Baloch with the overseas, the economic, 
cultural and social poverty, and the religious differences of the center and the periphery in Iran, 
along with Wahabion's propaganda that the Iranian government has been a Shiite system, and not an 
Islamic government has contributed to the development of Wahhabism. Examples of such groups 
are the Al-Furqan Party of Balochistan Iran, which is a largely religious organization, and the 
dissident Rumi is active in the Iranian Shiite regime. This party in Pakistan is affiliated with the 
Sahaba Army, which is ideologically oriented to the Deobandi School. Through the activities of the 
Wahhabi propaganda groups, Sunni extremists who sought to eliminate discrimination and protect 
the Sunni sanctities grew up in the area. 
The influence of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the tradition of Iran has widened in recent years, as 
religious and secular universities in Saudi Arabia give the Iranian Students an annual amount of 
attention to scholarship. The same applies to Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan has become a security 
challenge in relations between the two countries with the strengthening of extremist groups on the 
Iranian borders and the training of their religious and operative forces on their soil. Promotion of 
Wahhabi religious thoughts, especially the efforts to form multiple religious organizations, in 
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addition to strengthening the divergence energy of these areas towards the central core of the 
government, has increased the convergence of Sunni Sunni and Hanifa Baluchi eastern and 
southeastern parts of Iran.  
There are also some terrorist groups such as Jandallah, in the newer form of the Ansar and the 'Adal 
Movement', in Sistan and Baluchistan and with some radical scholars in Pakistan that are under the 
command of military training of some elements of al-Qaeda. These groups carry out terrorist 
operations inside Iran's soil and burgeon and hide behind Pakistani soil after being murdered inside 
Iran (Kanani and Fadavi, 2016:13). 
Challenging these currents makes provincial security issues more complicated, so that with the anti-
Shiite approach of these groups to flood Shiite and Sunni conflicts and the Sistine and Baluchistan 
controversy, the hatred of Sunnis from the Sistineas as a factor of government led to a high level of 
tensions Following the same propaganda strategy, the Jundallah group, headed by Abdul Malik 
Rigi, had been carrying out terrorist operations since 2005 and attempted to justify such acts using 
Wahhabi literature. 
The role of Pakistan and Saudi intelligence agencies is also remarkable in this regard. This has led 
to the concentration of the country's military, security and intelligence forces in Sistan and 
Baluchistan and has led to multi-level militancy in this area. Thus, on the one hand, the police have 
traditionally been fighting the trafficking phenomenon and providing security in the province. On 
the other hand, with the increase in insecurity and the presence of al-Qaeda forces in the region, the 
Revolutionary Guard was sent to the region for cultural and military struggle. Finally, the influence 
of the security organizations of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in fundamentalist movements also called 




In order to prevent the occurrence of ethnic-religious issues, there must be a general public 
participation in the community, regardless of ethnicity, religion, language, race or culture, all 
peoples should be involved in equal decisions and decisions. In a multi-ethnic society, the 
movement for establishing national unity, respecting the rights of ethnic groups and eliminating the 
grounds for any inequitable inter-ethnic indoctrination will create the grounds for national security. 
The issue that the Baloch and Sunnis are currently asking for is national participation. The reason 
for this is also clear, because ethnicities have come to the conclusion that if a person from a regional 
level has a degree in management, then that region will grow dramatically.  
In the current sensitive situation of Sistan and Baluchestan province, there is a cross between 
religious demands and demands, this stage is one of the most sensitive and complex historical 
passages that cannot be managed except by thinking and thinking, managing and modifying the 
existing religious and religious beliefs. It passed well and guaranteed the security of the province 
and the country. (Naghibzadeh, 2016). 
Causes of Saudi interference in religious affairs of Iran. 
Although Iran and Saudi Arabia are both recognized as Muslim countries and collaborate with the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, ideological issues are one of the main factors that have 
compromised the two countries, and this has negatively affected the cooperation of the two 
countries.  
Continuing the pressure of Saudi extremist organizations against the Shiites and possibly Iran's 
supportive measures has affected the relations between the two countries and may intensify the 
reactions between them. One of the most important features that makes these ideological issues 
more exaggerated is Saudi Arabia's unification with the United States and the presence of global 
powers in the country. Another important factor is Wahhabi, which has spread across the region by 
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Saudi Arabia. The Saudis became more active in spreading this thinking in the world. The group led 
the formation of new dialects in global geopolitics by managing some terrorist acts, such as the 
organization of the September 11 events. Including the discourse on the war on terrorism, which 
provided the context for the presence of trans-regional powers in the vicinity of Iran  ( Mehrabi and 
Attarnezhad, 2014:14-15). 
Iran and Saudi Arabia have never had a positive perception because of their distinctive Iranian-Arab 
identity and the rivalry between the two countries in the Gulf region and the Middle East. Before 
the Islamic Revolution and in the second Pahlavi era, these two countries were inevitably under the 
influence of the ruling Cold War and bipolar discourse, and in particular to prevent Soviet influence 
in the region. The two countries were partly upset by fears of another Western rival, Iraq, under the 
two-sided policy of Nixon-Kissinger, which, with the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution, lost two-
pillar politics. 
The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran led not only to the continuation of the geopolitics of 
the two countries but also to the revival of the Shiites of the region, which added the ideological 
factor to the rivalry between the two countries. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the 
United States lost one of its special allies and one of its strategic spheres of influence. Hence, Saudi 
Arabia presented itself as a serious replacement for Iran. After Saudi Arabia became a strategic ally 
of the United States in the region. It is aligned with America as Iran-US relationship is dark after 
the Islamic Revolution. In other words, the presence and influence of one of the non-aligned 
countries with the Islamic Republic of Iran in Saudi Arabia has led to a breakdown of the shared 
mentality and values between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the wall of distrust between these two 




On the other hand, with the advent of the Islamic revolution, revolutionary Shi'ite ideology was 
seen as a powerful rival against the conservative Wahhabi Arab identity. In fact, Saudi Arabia was a 
kingdom based on the Wahhabi ideology against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a Shiite-dominated 
Waliyat Fiqiyah, each of which both claimed the leadership of the Islamic world. This competitor 
was not only Arab, but also Sunni, and in all respects different from Saudi Arabia. There was a 
serious struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world, and there is now a negative 
effect on the relations between the two countries. Of course, it should be noted that the attention of 
Saudi Arabia to the intellectual and political leadership of the Islamic world is raised before it 
comes from the origins of one billion and two hundred million Muslims in the world as national 
goals in the region and in the world (Eram, 2016: 5-15). 
The relations between the two major countries of the Middle East and the Gulf region, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, have always fluctuated between the pattern of coexistence and conflict. After the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran, a conflict pattern has dominated the relations between the two countries, 
which, according to many researchers, can be referred to as the Regional Cold War. 
The main reason for this was the regional, ideological and geopolitical rivalry of the two countries. 
In fact, with the rule of the game with zero sum, the increase in the strength of each of these two 
regional actors is considered as a threat to the other. The pressure of Saudi Arabia and its allies on 
the Iraqi Shiite government, attempts to undermine the Shi'a and Hezbollah parties in Lebanon, 
support the Bahraini Sunni ruler, and prevent the establishment of democracy and power of the 
Shiites in Bahrain, and withdraw Syria from the queues of the allies of Iran by changing the regime 
in that country. With the support of extremist and jihadist groups, the power of Iran and the 
manifestation of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the West are influenced by three 





The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia includes a wide field of competition; the Gulf, the 
Middle East, the Muslim world and the international arena. The two countries saw themselves as 
serious rivals to influence the Middle East, in particular, the Persian Gulf region, at least since the 
1979 Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's.  
At best, cooperation between the two countries has been almost always suspicious. In addition, in 
2011, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran was due to intense controversy over the wave 
of the Arab Spring's turmoil and Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain in support of its 
kingdom and Iran's support for Shi'ites, as well as the support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria And ... it 
took a wonderful direction . The rivalry between these two countries is often exacerbated by 
ideological and geopolitical differences, which increase their hostility during regional turbulences 
and unrest. 
In general, ideological and geopolitical rivalries between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Iraq, Lebanon, 
the Gulf region, and the recent developments in Bahrain, Yemen, as well as their indirect 
encounters in Syria, make it difficult to reduce tensions in relations between the two countries. On 
the other hand, at the structural level of the international system, the negation of the role of Iran's 
stabilization in the regional order and the escalation of the Iran-Iran terror program, especially in the 
context of Iran's peaceful nuclear program, and in the region's regionalization of the Shiite element 
in regional politics in the light of developments in Iraq and then in Lebanon, Led to the sensitivity 
of the Arabs and Saudis towards Iran. 
Therefore, both countries are pushing for various ways to increase the cost of implementing the 
policies of the other side in the region, in order to prevent the implementation of other plans to win 
this cold war. Considering the hypothesis of this research, it can be said that Saudi Arabia, using 
religious affiliation with Balochistan residents of Iran, has made important efforts such as the 
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possibility of free education for religious scholars, the payment of financial assistance to their 
groups, the promotion of Shiite fear, encouragement and accompaniment for the exercise of 
International sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran and to divert the regional policies of the 
Islamic Republic and to entertain its politicians in internal affairs.  
In the wake of the expansion of existing tensions to other border provinces of the country, it has 
failed in most of the materials, because the national culture of Iran, which during thousands of years 
of peaceful life of ethnic groups and religious groups has created a certain amount of cultural 
integrity, which is a kind of national integrity It is against the influence of foreigners, it prevents 
cultural and ethnic self-harm in Iran; of course, considering the economic issues, there are groups 
and individuals who are out of this cultural reach and are working towards the goals of Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, it can be said that the hypothesis of this research has been proved and Saudi 
Arabia has used its influence in the region of Balochistan to control its policies. Thus, with the 
improvement of the cultural and economic conditions of the border regions, it prevented the growth 
of affiliated groups in these areas. 
To overcome the current state of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
the two countries must reduce regional tensions and improve political relations, as the continuation 
of this process will reduce the gradual progress of these two major countries in the Middle East and 
the Islamic world, while the two countries By emphasizing Islamic communion, you can help 
improve your relationship. Here are some of the ways to improve Iran-Saudi relations: 
- Reducing religious tensions by giving more freedom to more Shiite and Sunni groups in both 
countries. 
- Joint attention of the two countries to the issue of pilgrimage and pilgrimage. 
- The emphasis on Islamic and Quranic unity in order to avoid divisions in the Islamic world. 
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- Creating communications for tourism at all levels for the people of the two countries to meet each 
other. 
- Improving the political and international relations of the two countries. 
- Improving economic relations between the two countries. 
- Emphasizing national interests in relations between the two countries. 
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